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Does the type of family control affect the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm value? 
 
ABSTRACT 
Our objective is to disentangle which family business characteristics enable family ownership 
to be an effective corporate governance mechanism. To this aim, we investigate whether the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is moderated by the type of 
family influence. This study shows that family control positively affects performance, 
primarily when family members serve on the board and when the founder is still influential. 
Our findings hold when we control for the general blockholder effect and they are robust to a 
battery of tests. We conclude that the impact of ownership concentration on firm value differs 
across family firms. 
JEL classification: G32. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
La Porta et al. (1999) showed that companies are typically controlled by an ultimate owner 
with a significant proportion of shares in the firm. And among all ultimate owner types, 
family control is the most frequent form of organizational structure (Morck et al. 2005). 
Despite the prevalence of family firms in many countries and the influence of family owners 
throughout the world, the evidence on the effect of family ownership on corporate 
performance is still inconclusive. The identity of large shareholders matters in corporate 
governance (Sarkar and Sarkar 2000). Therefore, we analyze whether the performance 
difference between family and non-family firms is mainly due to particular family firm 
characteristics. Using a unique sample of listed companies from nine Western European 
countries, we find empirical evidence supporting that the superior performance of family-
controlled corporations is primarily due to those in which the family is directly represented 
on the board of directors and those in which the founder influence is still present. 
This study contributes to the existing finance and family business literature in several 
different ways. First, we provide empirical results on the different impacts of family control 
on firm value relative to other ownership structures by using a restrictive definition of family 
firm that excludes from this group of corporations the so-called lone founder businesses. 
Second, we contribute to the ongoing debate about the benefits and costs of family control as 
compared to other organizational forms by taking into account the possibility that the 
different performance of family firms is mainly driven by certain types of family-controlled 
corporations. And third, the use of the panel data methodology to estimate our models allows 
us to overcome several problems highlighted in prior finance literature (i.e., the unobservable 
heterogeneity and endogeneity of explanatory variables). 
 
II. OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION, FIRM VALUE AND FAMILY FIRMS 
The owner-manager agency problem occurs when ownership and management are separated 
because the firm’s owner delegates the decision-taking process to a manager (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) who may have motivations that do not coincide with shareholders’ interests. 
Corporate governance appears as a solution to this agency conflict, with ownership 
concentration as one possible internal control mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Large 
shareholders solve the free-rider problem that occurs when investors do not own enough 
company shares to assume the costs of effectively monitoring management. Minority 
shareholders do not have incentives to control managers since their costs would exceed the 
benefits obtained from that supervision. If ownership concentration indeed motivates 
management monitoring, it should have a positive impact on firm value. However, the 
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existence of a large owner in the company can create another agency conflict, the one 
between dominant and minority shareholders. This conflict arises due to the risk that 
controlling shareholders expropriate wealth from small investors, which in turn leads to a 
decrease in firm value. This is the main agency problem when ownership concentration is too 
high (Yeh et al. 2001). 
In this context, the relevant question that needs to be answered is: when does the 
monitoring function of the largest owner prevails over the incentive to expropriate minority 
shareholders’ wealth? The identity of large shareholders (and, more precisely, the 
differentiation between family and non-family controlling shareholders) is of great 
importance in the study of the ownership-performance relationship (Holderness and Sheehan 
1988). Controversy still exists on the influence that family ownership has on firm value, with 
a strand of literature that points out the potential benefits of family control and supports a 
positive effect of this type of organizational structure (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Maury 
2006; Andres 2008) and other investigations that, on the contrary, support a negative impact 
(Barth et al. 2005). Previous studies argue that active and passive family involvement might 
influence corporate performance differently (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Andres 2008). 
When family members are involved in the management of the firm, they can better control 
outside chief executive officers (CEOs) and, as a consequence, CEO turnover is reduced 
(González et al. 2015), which confers more stability on the company. The convergence of 
interest effect that characterizes the relation between insider ownership and corporate 
performance (e.g., Morck et al. 1988; Stulz 1988) also supports this line of reasoning. In light 
of these arguments, we propose the first hipothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The stronger positive impact of ownership concentration on value in family 
firms is mainly due to those firms in which family members serve on the board of directors. 
Morck et al. (1988) already suggested that firm age should be taken into account when 
analyzing the ownership-performance relationship. We expect expropriation incentives of 
family members to be lower when ownership is still in the hands of the first generation for 
several reasons. First, first-generation family firms have not still faced one of the most 
controversial decisions inside this type of organization; i.e., the succession decision. If 
succession is not properly planned, generational transfers of control can result in squabbles 
and tensions among family members (Blumentritt et al. 2013). The fight over the resources of 
large families increases the motivation for extracting private benefits. Such family conflicts 
will have a negative effect on firm value. This argument is in line with the results of Miller et 
al. (2007), who conclude that only lone founder businesses perform better than other US 
public corporations, while true family businesses do not show superior market valuations.
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Therefore, we can argue that young family firms are better performers than old ones. 
Second, prior research supports that family firms controlled or run by the founder perform 
differently as compared to those in the hands of second or later generations (Villalonga and 
Amit 2006). The different performance of old family firms can be in part explained by how 
managers are appointed in these businesses. Individual family interests, rather than corporate 
objectives such as value maximization, are likely to influence management appointments in 
family firms, leading to a decline in corporate value post-succession. Additionally, although 
founders that manage young family firms usually possess unique skills and experience, as 
well as the managerial talent necessary to run the company, succeeding generations in old 
family corporations can lack such entrepreneurial talent (Anderson and Reeb 2003). 
Consistent with this view, Bennedsen et al. (2007) find significant declines in firm 
performance surrounding the appointment of family managers as opposed to professional 
                                                 
1
 These authors define lone founder businesses as those in which an individual is one of the company’s 
founders and is also a manager or a large owner, with no other family members involved; whereas true family 
businesses are those that include multiple family members as major owners or managers. 
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managers. Beyond the typical profit maximization objective of other owner types, family 
firms consider the business as a family legacy to be continued. When succession takes place, 
founder’s nepotism may lead to the appointment of a family member, instead of a more 
qualified external professional, as manager. Such appointments are a way of expropriating 
minority shareholders as it implies that the family’s goals prevail over the firm’s interests. 
Since young family firms are generally founder-run corporations and old family firms are 
more likely to be in the hands of second or later generations (Fiss and Zajac 2004), we pose 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The stronger positive impact of ownership concentration on value in family 
firms is mainly due to those firms controlled by the first generation. 
 
III. SAMPLE, VARIABLES, AND MODELS 
To test our hypotheses, we obtain a sample of publicly listed companies from nine Western 
European countries. Our main source of information is the Amadeus database, which 
provides the market, financial, and ownership structure data that we need for the analyses. 
Additionally, some macroeconomic information required to calculate some of the control 
variables are extracted from the Main Economic Indicators published by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The final sample comprises 834 publicly 
listed companies (4,729 observations) for the time period spanning from 1999 to 2006. We do 
not cover years beyond 2006 for two main reasons. First, in 2007 started the turbulence in 
financial markets that lead to the global financial crisis in 2008 (Trichet 2010). We avoid 
analyzing this period of time because the resulting global financial turmoil might have caused 
changes in firm value and ownership structure inexplicable with rational arguments. Studying 
a stable time span is more suitable to understand the role of family firms in the ownership-
value relationship. Second, we focus on this time frame for a better comparison with other 
studies that do not cover the crisis period either (Maury 2006). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The dependent variable in our models is firm value, IAVit, which we adjust to account for 
industry effects. The main independent variable is ownership concentration, OCit, which is 
the percentage of votes held by the largest shareholder of the company. And we consider 
several control variables based on previous studies. All variable definitions, along with their 
descriptive statistics, are presented in Table 1. We consider a company as being family 
controlled if the largest shareholder is a family or a member of the founding family with at 
least 10% of the company’s voting rights. To identify corporations in which a family is the 
largest owner, we proceed as follows. First, we identify the firm-year observations in which 
the largest shareholder is an individual or a family. From these companies, in some cases 
Amadeus asserts that the largest shareholder is a family, but in other cases only the name of 
an individual is provided. We classify the former as family controlled as long as the family 
owns at least 10% of the company’s voting rights. Second, when the largest owner is just an 
individual, we investigate whether there is another individual with the same family name 
either on the board of directors or with a stake in the firm. In these cases, we can assure that 
at least two members of the same family are involved in the company and therefore consider 
it as being family controlled. This group of corporations, in which the largest owner is an 
individual, must also fulfill the voting rights criterion to be included in the family firm 
sample. By adopting this definition, we avoid including in the same group companies owned 
solely by the founder and those with several family members (e.g., Cheung et al. 2010). 
We develop two models to estimate our hypotheses. To test Hypothesis 1, we propose the 
following specification: 
 IAVit = α0 + (α1 + λ1BFDit + β1NBFDit)OCit + ϕXit + εit, (1) 
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where Xit is the set of control variables and εit is the error term. Table 1 contains detailed 
definitions of all variables. In model (1), we split the family firm sample into two groups 
depending on whether family members are present in the board of directors (BFDit) or not 
(NBFDit). 
In addition, to test Hypothesis 2, we estimate the following model: 
 IAVit = α0 + (α1 + φ1FGFDit + ψ1SGFDit)OCit + ϕXit + εit. (2) 
In model (2) the splitting criterion is whether the business is controlled either by the first 
generation (FGFDit) or by succeeding generations (SGFDit). 
We use the panel data methodology in the estimation of the models; in particular, we use 
the system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for two main reasons. First, 
this method allows us to control for individual heterogeneity. This issue is very important in 
our analysis because every firm, and especially family ones, has its own specificity that gives 
rise to a particular behavior closely linked to the culture of the company, which in family 
firms is instilled by the owner family. Second, our methodology helps us to mitigate the 
endogeneity problem, which occurs when the error term is correlated with any of the 
explanatory variables. Regarding reverse causality concerns, as Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
indicate, it is not clear whether family ownership improves corporate performance, or if 
superior performance leads families to maintain their stake in the company. We finally check 
for the potential misspecification of the models. First, we use the Hansen J statistic of over-
identifying restrictions to test for the absence of correlation between the instruments and the 
error term. Second, we use the m2 statistic, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), to test 
for the lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residual. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
The regression results that enable us to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 are presented in column 1 of 
Tables 2 and 3, respectively. As shown in column 1 of Table 2, the positive impact of 
ownership concentration on value for family businesses with family representation on the 
board is stronger than that for the remaining family firms. This finding thus supports 
Hypothesis 1 and suggests that the convergence of interest effect proposed in prior studies 
(e.g., Morck et al. 1988; Stulz 1988) similarly applies to family firms in which family 
members serve on the board of directors. In line with previous family business works, we 
find that active family involvement in the firm management is positive in term of firm 
performance (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Maury 2006; Andres 2008). A reason for this result 
is the argument that family members should play an active role in the company and serve as 
stewards of the firm to achieve a better outcome because such active role will contribute to 
reinforce the family leadership inside the corporation. 
[Insert Tables 2 and Table 3 about here] 
With respect to the different performance between founder-led family corporations and 
those in the hands of second and later generations, the results presented in column 1 of Table 
3 indicate that the founder effect plays an important role in Western European family firms. 
As can be seen in this column, family businesses run by the first generation outperform 
family firms controlled by second and successive generations, consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
Moreover, both types of family businesses outperform non-family firms. Our results support 
the view that, since family and founder owners have different objectives and governance 
practices, we should make a distinction between them when analyzing their effect on firm 
value. This finding can be due to the succession process that old family firms are likely to 
have experienced. Recall that succession can lead to the expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ wealth as a consequence of the potential family conflicts and the appointment 
of less qualified family candidates to management positions. This argument is consistent with 
previous family business literature that finds that the better performance of family firms is to 
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a large extent attributable to young family corporations and founder-led family companies 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006). 
We conduct several robustness tests to check the validity and reliability of the results 
discussed above, and we continue to find support for our two hypotheses. First, we control for 
the blockholder effect by including in the model the interaction between ownership 
concentration, OCit, and a blockholder effect dummy, BEit. Results can be found in column 2 
of Tables 2 and 3. The empirical evidence obtained corroborates our previous findings. 
Second, to allow for a better comparison with previous empirical studies similar to ours, we 
re-estimate all models using an alternative measure of the firm’s market value (i.e., industry-
adjusted Tobin’s q, IAQit). The results are provided in column 3 of Tables 2 and 3. Third, we 
estimate our models after excluding financial companies (whose primary SIC code is in the 
interval 60-69), resulting in a final sample of 658 companies (3,788 observations). The 
estimated coefficients can be found in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3. Finally, we have also 
performed all analyses described in the study, including the robustness tests, using other 
ownership concentration thresholds to delineate family control. The regression results based 
on the 20% and 25% cutoff points, available from the authors upon request, are qualitatively 
the same as the ones discussed earlier. In sum, the results of the robustness checks let us 
conclude that our findings are consistent and reliable across specifications. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we examine how family control affects the market value of a firm in an effort to 
shed light on the issue of whether family firms are really superior performers as compared to 
non-family corporations. More precisely, we investigate the possibility that the performance 
difference of family businesses is moderated by specific firm-level characteristics, such as an 
active family involvement in management and the generation controlling the company. From 
a governance perspective, we analyze whether different family control types shape the 
balance between the monitoring function of ownership concentration and the expropriation 
risk associated with large shareholders. Our analyses disentangle the value implications for 
family firms compared to their non-family counterparts. 
Our empirical evidence shows that family firms generally outperform non-family firms 
and, as a result, family ownership can be beneficial to minority shareholders. This positive 
effect of family ownership is mainly due to those family companies in which family members 
serve on the board of directors and those family businesses controlled by the first generation. 
The present work has important implications for family firms. On the one hand, our results 
highlight the importance of family presence on the board of directors in order to increase the 
value of the company. In fact, the presence of family members on the board will allow the 
family to transmit its values to the management team and will reinforce the family business 
culture, which can constitute an important source of competitive advantage. Moreover, an 
active family involvement in the company will contribute to the dissemination of the 
corporate culture throughout the organization. On the other hand, the study indicates that 
generational changes pose one of the biggest challenges to the success of the family firm, as 
generally accepted among family business experts. However, those family firms that are able 
to plan the transition in advance and to place the business success above personal family 
interests are likely to strengthen the company’s outcome. To achieve this goal, founders must 
avoid nepotistic appointments. An added benefit of avoiding this type of appointment is that 
family firms can overcome their lack of managerial resources (Nieto et al. 2015). Family 
shareholders also need to address the possible conflicts that might arise during the transition 
of the company from one generation to the next more efficiently. 
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Table 1   Definition and summary statistics of variables 
Panel A: Definition of variables 
Variable Symbol Definition 
Industry-
adjusted firm 
value 
IAVit Firm value is the market value of equity divided by the replacement value of 
total assets. The market value of equity is equal to market capitalization 
(number of recorded shares multiplied by the year-end price) divided by the 
replacement value of total assets. The replacement value of total assets is 
obtained as in Pindado et al. (2011). The industry-adjusted firm value is 
calculated by subtracting the industry median firm value from the firm’s value. 
Industry medians are computed at the most precise SIC level in which there is a 
minimum of five companies. 
Industry-
adjusted 
Tobin’s q 
IAQit Tobin’s q is the market value of equity plus market value of debt, all divided by 
the replacement value of total assets. The industry-adjusted Tobin’s q is 
calculated by subtracting the industry median Tobin’s q from the firm’s Tobin’s 
q. Industry medians are computed at the most precise SIC level in which there 
is a minimum of five companies. 
Ownership 
concentration 
OCit Percentage of votes held by the largest shareholder of the company. 
 
Family dummy FDit Dummy variable that equals one if the largest shareholder is an individual or a 
family with at least 10% of the votes (we also use 20% and 25% thresholds as 
robustness tests). Additionally, when the largest shareholder is an individual, 
for the company to be considered family controlled, we require that another 
individual with the same family name either serves on the board of directors or 
has a stake in the firm. Otherwise, the variable takes the value of zero. 
Board family 
dummy 
BFDit Dummy variable that equals one for family firms in which at least one member 
of the controlling family serves on the board of directors, and zero otherwise. 
Non-board 
family dummy 
NBFDit Dummy variable that equals one for family firms in which no family member 
serves on the board of directors, and zero otherwise. 
First-generation 
family dummy 
FGFDit Dummy variable that equals one for family firms in which the founder effect is 
still present, and zero otherwise. Based on previous family business literature 
(Fiss and Zajac 2004), we consider that the founder effect is still present in 
family firms that are less than 30 years old. 
Succeeding- 
generation 
family dummy 
SGFDit Dummy variable that equals one for family firms in which the founder effect is 
no longer present (i.e., those that are more than 30 years old), and zero 
otherwise. 
Size  SIZEit Log of replacement value of total assets. 
Debt ratio DEBTit Following Pindado et al. (2011), the debt ratio is the market value of long-term 
debt divided by the sum of the market value of long-term debt, the book value 
of short-term debt, and the market value of equity. 
Cash flow CFit Net profit plus book depreciation, all divided by the replacement value of total 
assets. 
Age  AGEit Log of the difference between the corresponding period of time minus the date 
of incorporation of the company. 
Stake of the 
second largest 
shareholder 
SOCit Percentage of votes held by the second largest shareholder of the firm. 
Blockholder 
effect dummy 
BEit Dummy variable that equals one if there is a shareholder in the firm with at 
least 10% of the votes (we also use 20% and 25% thresholds as robustness 
tests), and zero otherwise. 
Panel B: Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Min. Median Max. 
IAVit 0.184 0.819 -0.950 -0.023 11.075 
IAQit 0.177 0.805 -0.966 -0.029 10.947 
OCit 0.246 0.189 0.003 0.178 0.980 
SIZEit 12.811 1.891 9.277 12.575 19.154 
DEBTit 0.078 0.099 0.000 0.047 0.821 
CFit 0.075 0.088 -0.912 0.079 0.781 
AGEit 3.402 0.987 0.693 3.434 6.443 
SOCit 0.106 0.078 0.000 0.090 0.500 
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Table 2   Ownership concentration and firm value: Presence of family members on the board of directors 
Test 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var. IAVit IAVit IAQit IAVit 
OCit 0.423*** 0.770** 0.496*** 0.439*** 
 (0.111) (0.358) (0.113) (0.132) 
BFDit x OCit 1.113*** 1.116*** 1.364*** 1.475*** 
 (0.267) (0.264) (0.267) (0.276) 
NBFDit x OCit 0.243 0.258 0.303** -0.393 
 (0.161) (0.159) (0.154) (0.285) 
SIZEit 0.002 0.016 0.007 0.046* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) 
DEBTit -1.388*** -1.552*** -1.317*** -1.851*** 
 (0.130) (0.133) (0.129) (0.166) 
CFit 1.392*** 1.226*** 1.197*** 1.208*** 
 (0.121) (0.110) (0.152) (0.169) 
AGEit -0.076*** -0.086*** -0.078*** -0.084*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
SOCit -1.345*** -1.497*** -1.362*** -1.725*** 
 (0.156) (0.152) (0.165) (0.214) 
BEit x OCit  -0.330   
  (0.285)   
Constant 0.439** 0.337 0.390* 0.002 
 (0.214) (0.216) (0.217) (0.290) 
m2 -0.30 -0.32 -0.54 -0.56 
Hansen 241.33 (200) 260.01 (225) 247.50 (200) 210.81 (197) 
N 4,729 4,729 4,729 3,788 
Notes: Definitions of variables in Table 1. The models are estimated using the system GMM. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3   Ownership concentration and firm value: First vs. succeeding-generation family firms 
Test 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var IAVit IAVit IAQit IAVit 
OCit 0.576*** 0.686* 0.636*** 0.513*** 
 (0.124) (0.380) (0.107) (0.136) 
FGFDit x OCit 1.757*** 1.923*** 1.981*** 1.947*** 
 (0.316) (0.310) (0.316) (0.273) 
SGFDit x OCit 0.794*** 0.882*** 0.842*** 0.949*** 
 (0.191) (0.187) (0.190) (0.159) 
SIZEit 0.029 0.048** 0.033 0.061*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
DEBTit -1.480*** -1.699*** -1.442*** -1.887*** 
 (0.129) (0.126) (0.115) (0.151) 
CFit 1.260*** 1.287*** 0.848*** 1.106*** 
 (0.138) (0.115) (0.162) (0.147) 
AGEit -0.080*** -0.084*** -0.074*** -0.065*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
SOCit -1.532*** -1.781*** -1.659*** -2.028*** 
 (0.173) (0.194) (0.167) (0.182) 
BEit x OCit  -0.143   
  (0.301)   
Constant 0.097 -0.052 0.064 -0.247 
 (0.282) (0.273) (0.298) (0.285) 
m2 -0.24 -0.25 -0.57 -0.49 
Hansen 234.63 (200) 259.26 (225) 235.72 (200) 207.60 (200) 
N 4,729 4,729 4,729 3,788 
Notes: Definitions of variables in Table 1. The models are estimated using the system GMM. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
